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Abstract 
RIGHI, ROBERT J. - The Shifting Dynamics of International Reserve Currencies 
ADVISORS - Eshragh Motahar and Jue Wang  
 
 Throughout most of post World War II period, the United States dollar has 
been globally accepted as the dominant reserve currency. This dominance comes 
with “exorbitant privilege” or special benefits such as not having a balance of 
payments problem. Therefore, with the shifting of global geopolitical balance of 
power in the age of Trump, along with the recognition by the IMF of the Chinese 
renminbi as an international reserve currency in 2015, it is important to 
understand the modern influence of reserve currencies. We provide an updated 
study of the status of the dollar, the euro, and in particular, the renminbi as it is an 
upcoming reserve currency. To do so, we use currency exchange rate data and 
apply modified workhorse regression models analyzing the co-movement of 149 
countries’ currencies with each of the five major reserve currencies. We are then 
able to assign each country’s gross domestic product at purchasing power parity 
to a reserve currency bloc in order to obtain a global sphere of influence for each 
reserve currency. We find that the United States retains its dominance but faces 
challenges from the renminbi and the euro in recent years as the international 
monetary system becomes tri-polar. We analyze particular current events in 
specific countries and regions to help explain why we see this shifting dynamic.  
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
A. Statement of Purpose 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the relative decline of the 
United States dollar (USD) as a reserve currency. In particular, we want to 
quantify the use of renminbi (RMB) as an upcoming reserve currency and predict 
its future impact. Our work seeks to provide an updated view of the international 
monetary system and compare these results to what previous researchers have 
found. This is extremely important, for many reasons to be discussed, but 
particularly as the Chinese currency has gained more recognition in recent years, 
there has been a very large increase in Chinese investments and trade, and there 
have been shifting political climates globally.   
 
B. Background 
 
 Leading up to the 1950’s the United States did not have the dominant 
reserve currency as Great Brittan did. As seen in Figure 1 that changed drastically 
as the dollar has been dominant ever since. However, in recent years we now see 
a rise in other currencies to rival the dollar. This work will investigate the global 
influence of the major reserve currencies including the RMB and analyze the 
impacts that a paradigm shift will have on the global economy. 
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Figure 1- Currency Composition of Globally Disclosed Foreign Exchange 
Reserves in percent.  
 
Source: Eichengreen, Chitu, and Mehl (2016) 
 
Reserve currencies are held by countries’ central banks in order to be used 
in international transactions. This includes investments and debt obligations. They 
also are used to manage exchange rates. Reserve currencies have long been 
studied to gain a better understanding of international finance and trade. 
Throughout most of the modern day history of the international monetary system, 
the United States has played a dominant role. There are large economic 
implications for the United States having the dominant reserve currency. One 
such implication is that there is a very high demand for the USD and countries 
have a significant interest in seeing the dollar do well. The US has what is known 
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as “Exorbitant Privilege,” that is it will not have a balance of payments problem 
as all of its transactions are done in the USD. In addition, since the United States 
controls the money supply it benefits from seigniorage or the value gained by 
minting money. However, there are some negatives associated with being the 
dominant reserve currency. This would include increased spending, and possibly 
cheaper imports hurting domestic firms. However, being the major reserve 
currency is in large part beneficial.  
Therefore, it is extremely important to study the international monetary 
system and to examine the shifts that occur over time. The international reserve 
system as a whole can be criticized with an overreliance on the dollar, and the 
United States unfairly taking advantage of the benefits of being the major reserve 
currency. An example can be seen with the large amounts of spending the United 
States had in the Vietnam War, which led to the end of the Bretton Woods system 
in 1971. Conversely, the USD can provide stability, liquidity, and safe assets in 
times of financial crises. It provides a reliable network and a common currency 
that most countries use in international exchanges and transactions.     
Despite these arguments, there has been a push for diversification. In fact, 
recent years have seen that there has been diversification in the international 
monetary system particularly with the rise of the euro leading to a bi-polar 
system. We would like to examine China’s role in this increased diversification, 
particularly in the years after 2015, when the RMB was officially recognized as a 
reserve currency in a political climate characterized by a Chinese push for global 
power and a United States shift toward nationalism in the age of Trump. As the 
	   4	  
reserve system shifts to a tri-polar system there are many economic implications 
for the United States in terms of its exorbitant privilege.    
 
C. Structure of Thesis 
 
 This thesis consists of five chapters with Chapter One and Chapter Five 
being the introduction and the conclusion. Chapter Two will detail previous works 
on reserve currencies. This will look at why the study of reserve currencies, and 
subsequently this thesis is important. It will also detail previous methods of 
studying reserve currencies and detailing how the methods we used were 
developed. Chapter Three will discus the methods of analysis that were employed 
in this thesis such as workhorse regression methods, forecasting, and identifying 
currency blocs. Finally, Chapter Four will outline our results and their 
significance. 
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Chapter Two 
Literature Review  
 
A. Introduction 
 
 This chapter is dedicated to analyzing the relevant literature pertaining to 
this work. More specifically, we will look at three major topics of discussion. The 
first area of interest is the role international reserves from a historical perspective. 
This allows us to frame the importance of our study in a historical context. Next, 
we would like to describe China’s potential for, as well as the barriers to, 
establishing a major global reserve currency. Finally, we will discuss various 
methods that have previously been used to measure the size of reserve shares. In 
addition, we will describe the most important work relating to this research, and 
highlight the ideas and topics that will be built upon. 
 
B. History of International Reserves 
 
There have been many major events in the history of the international 
monetary system that have overtime shaped it into what we see today and have 
allowed for the diversification that this work seeks to study and understand. The 
first major event that we would like to discuss is the formation of the Bretton 
Woods system in 1944. The landmark conference in New Hampshire laid the 
foundation for the modern day international monetary system. This system 
maintained international exchange rates by backing currencies by gold. It also 
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allowed the United States to establish a global reserve currency, particularly 
because of the United States control of the global gold shares. This truly was an 
impactful event that gives researchers a timeframe to start studying international 
reserves. 
 The first major focus of Eichengreen, Chitu, and Mehl (2016) was to 
expand the data back in time to create a reliable look at this timeframe post 
Bretton Woods. As the paper discusses, when the Bretton Woods system began to 
take place the United States dollar (USD) was not always the major reserve 
currency. In fact, it was the British pound (GBP) that held this distinction. The 
researchers attribute this to relations that Great Brittan had following World War 
II. Many countries held ties to the British Empire and part of that allegiance 
involved holding the GBP. Yet as this work shows, in the early 1950’s there was a 
drastic shift to the USD as the major reserve currency that has continued until 
today.  
 Importantly, this shows that not only are there changes in the reserve 
currency market, but they can be extremely drastic. Therefore we can reason that 
it is quite possible that an important event, like the recognition of the Chinese 
renminbi (RMB) by the IMF as an international reserve currency, can trigger a 
dramatic change in the global shares of reserves. On the other hand, Eichengreen, 
Chitu, and Mehl’s research expanding data back in time shows that after this shift 
the United States share has remained relatively constant particularly after the 
establishment of the euro, which will be discussed in further detail later on. 
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The second major focus of Eichengreen, Chitu, and Mehl is to analyze 
how reserve currencies were impacted with the fall of the Bretton Woods system. 
The end of the Bretton Woods system can be characterized as overspending by 
the United States on the Vietnam War. This spending led to an inability to back 
the dollar by gold, which eventually caused the United States to end the Bretton 
Woods agreement in 1971. Many countries viewed, and still argue today that the 
spending was an abuse of the United States’ exorbitant privilege. By any means it 
created a significant change in the system of reserves.  
Eichengreen, Chitu, and Mehl’s research looks at the main differences 
prior to and after this time. What these researchers find is that post Bretton Woods 
there is a decrease in the importance of network effects and an increase in 
importance of policy credibility effects. That is, countries post Bretton Woods can 
see financial gains by holding one particular currency over another due to the 
floating exchange rates as opposed to the fixed rates seen earlier. In addition, with 
the more diversity of currency in the market there is less importance on what 
other countries choose to hold. Interestingly, the findings show that policy aimed 
at discouraging use of another currency has a greater impact on which reserve 
currencies are used than policies bolstering a particular one.  
Since we see countries having a greater ability to diversify which reserve 
currencies they hold, it opens the door for new currencies to take hold and gain a 
significant global share. Meanwhile, the United States must be more active to 
hold onto its share. Especially because, as Eichengreen, Chitu, and Mehl state, 
there are stark benefits to diversification as countries now have the ability to 
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monetize their reserves according to the “upheaval hypothesis.” The upheaval 
hypothesis asserts that the reserve currency system has altered after the shift from 
fixed to flexible exchange rates. This certainly plays a role as the RMB is 
recognized as a reserve currency.  
We begin to see even more diversification in the international monetary 
system with the formation of the Euro starting in 1999. Papaioannou and Portes 
(2008) evaluate the international status of the Euro in the first few years after its 
formation. The work saw that the euro had taken a foothold in global reserve 
shares, and predicted a gradual convergence of the shares of the USD and euro in 
the future. It was found that an era defined by globalism and increase in global 
trade was a determining factor in the Euro becoming a dominant reserve currency.  
The euro has maintained a relatively constant share of global reserves 
since their paper was written, but that does not discount the possibility that it will 
gain more. It does emphasize the ability for a new currency to become a major 
player as an international reserve. It would also be very interesting to compare 
how the RMB does in its initial years as a reserve currency compared to the euro. 
This is unfortunately a hard comparison to make, however, as there are some key 
differences between the two. Namely, many European countries had already 
established their currency as international reserves prior to the formation of the 
euro. The euro in turn already had a place in the market to take. This would have 
to be factored out in any comparison that is to be made between the RMB and the 
euro.   
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The International Monetary Fund (IMF) recognized the RMB as a reserve 
currency in 2015. We argue that this is a major event to help diversify the 
international monetary system. Our goal is to study the effects this change had 
internationally in the few years after it occurred. We will be able to do this by 
studying the RMB and its influence globally.   
Historically major events do tend to have big impacts on the 
diversification of the international monetary system. This is true with both the 
formation and demise of Bretton Woods, and the implementation of the euro. 
Adding to the importance of this work, these events serve to bolster the idea that 
because the RMB was recognized as a global reserve currency, it could serve a 
major role internationally. We will subsequently further discuss the current 
international conditions that add even more weight to this argument in the next 
sections.  
 
C. The Current State of China and Status of RMB 
 
 There have been many debates over the ability of China to be a major 
player internationally. For example Zhou (2009) argues that because of China’s 
growth, size, and growing trade networks it is destined to play a major role. Zhou 
also looks at the Chinese position that there is an overreliance on the dollar and 
that the RMB serves as a currency to help diversify the international reserve 
system. On the other hand Prasad (2015) argues that China faces too many 
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barriers, particularly with its political policies, and limitations that it has with the 
capital account as well as exchange rate.  
 Dollar (2018) looks at the arguments for and against China. First, the 
researcher recognizes that China is in a good position to have a major reserve 
currency in the future referencing the formidable traits listed above. However, 
Dollar argues that there are many impediments to its immediate and future rise. 
The author states that the main barrier that China faces is the freedom of its 
financial assets. The research finds that countries are less willing to take up a 
reserve currency if its capital account is closed. 
 China has many current policies that restrict both the access that 
foreigners have to Chinese assets as well as access that citizens have to financial 
assets. Other countries prefer to have open access, as the capital account is a large 
medium of exchange of foreign currencies. Therefore, Dollar argues that China 
will not be able to establish itself until it makes changes in regards to the capital 
account. Once China is able to make these changes then the other factors will kick 
in to succeed on the international market. 
Moreover, there are additional problems China faces in order to make 
these accounts more open. More specifically, this is the case with its exchange 
rates. China has in the past pegged its currency to the USD. That is the RMB will 
follow along with the rates of the USD. In addition, China has been accused of 
manipulating its currency and not allowing for it to be free floating, but instead 
keeping it in a desired range. Revisiting the upheaval hypothesis this poses a 
significant barrier to China’s international status. There would be very little 
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reason to choose the RMB as the dollar would provide a safer alternative with the 
same upside.  
Subsequently as China opens its capital account it quite possibly can face 
a currency appreciation crisis. Access to financial assets can create a large 
demand for the RMB. Therefore, we could see the value of the RMB skyrocket. 
This could in turn be detrimental to the Chinese economy being a manufacturing 
exporter. China relies on its ability to produce cheap exports, which is in part why 
it has been accused of devaluing currency. So changes must occur over a longer 
period of time.  
However, China has been the exception to the rules in many cases. As 
Dollar discuses, the country has extremely high development and economic 
growth for the institutions and rule of law relative to other countries. It is 
therefore reasonable to think that China can be an exception to the rule for 
international reserves as well. This is especially true because of its global 
influence in trade, and the recent stances on promoting the RMB globally. China, 
according to Dreher et al. (2017), spent about 80 billion USD in developing 
countries for infrastructure. This was a part of its Belt and Road project to expand 
trading networks and infrastructure.  
Dollar argues that this project actually is an example of stalled progress of 
the RMB in the international market. The reason is that China used mostly USD 
to pay for the development. In fact, only 2.6 percent was denoted in RMB. We 
argue the exact opposite: which is, despite most of the development being done in 
USD this is a major step to becoming a major world currency. Primarily this is 
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expanding China’s influence globally through trading blocs and importantly lays a 
foundation for a high volume of future global payment to be done in RMB. 
 Summers (2015) states that the One Belt, One Road Project involves 
connecting more than 60 countries that account for about a third of the entire 
global GDP. This is a major project in which China stands to possibly gain a lot 
from. Building a larger trade network expands the sphere of Chinese influence in 
trade, and can expand the RMB’s global influence. With an increase in trade 
volume we would expect an increase of use in the RMB in global transactions.  
This process will take a long time and the effects will not be seen 
immediately, as Ferdinand (2016) puts the project’s time frame at around thirty to 
thirty-five years. Yet it does highlight China’s willingness to expand globally and 
its desire for global influence. There are many factors that have presented 
themselves in the three years following the IMFs recognition of China as an 
official reserve currency. China’s expanding role internationally, coupled with 
global attitudes along with European and American policy, has created an 
interesting environment for the global role of the RMB that we argue is incredibly 
important to study in order to gauge the international monetary system now as 
well as to help understand the outlook of what we can expect in the future.  
There is a plethora of United States policy that have direct implications for 
the USD as a reserve currency as well as the RMB, which we argue are of a vital 
importance as to why the 2015-2018 timeframe must be studied. The most 
important is the election of Trump in 2016 that marks a shifting United States 
view from a globalist foreign policy to a more nationalistic one. We believe there 
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are three important policy points that have deterred or will deter countries from 
using the USD as a reserve currency and instead use other alternatives such as the 
euro or the RMB. The Trump administration’s stance on trade, the removal from 
the Iran Deal, and sanctions on Russia all can lead to impactful changes that our 
work looks to study.  
Trump has vehemently expressed his views on United States trade and the 
need for reform in international trade deals. One major policy that has major 
economic implications is the implementation of tariffs placed on international 
goods. For instance, according to Conca (2018) Trump has levied a 25% percent 
tariff on steel and 10% on solar aluminum. As this article states, this opens the 
door to a trade war as other countries place tariffs on United States products as 
well.   
This leads to a concept that Sheu and Kundu (2017) discuss known as 
trade diversion. Trade diversion is the shifting of trade to a less efficient exporter 
as the result of trade deals that reduce tariffs and barriers to trade. As the United 
States leaves trade deals and imposes tariffs, we expect countries to shift away 
from United States trade. With the reduction of trade the United States has with 
China, China will in turn seek other trade partners to “unload” its goods. In 
addition, China becomes a much more attractive country to trade with, as an 
alternative to the United States, as it expands and makes significant investments 
promoting international trade in the One Belt and One Road project. Again we 
argue that this in turn bolsters the need, or desire to use alternatives to the USD in 
international exchanges.  
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This is due to the fact that there will be less volume of trade done with the 
United States with these tariffs. In addition, there will be less direct exchanges 
with the United States. So, countries may view it more practical, especially with 
the Chinese views on globalization stated before, to use their own currency or 
other countries’ currencies when doing deals with them that do not involve the 
United States. It would simply be more efficient to establish networks to use the 
RMB in these transactions. We believe that these recent events can have a major 
impact on the global influence of the RMB as China continues to expand its 
trading networks and infrastructure.  
The next policy that we would like to assess is the United States 
withdrawal from the Iran deal. There has certainly been both support and 
opposition in United States politics. Barnes and Barron (2018) discuss the history 
of the policy, as well as the implications for a United States withdrawal from the 
deal. The work mentions that the United States European allies are not happy with 
the United States policy actions in this manner and discuss the future outlook 
there. Some allies are reluctantly supporting the United States, while others are 
weighing their own options. Barnes and Barron mention that the future outlook 
for United States and Iranian relations is certainly rocky, but this could certainly 
get backlash from the Europeans.    
The Iran policy is directly related to the relationship that the United States 
has with Russia. Slav (2018) talks about sanctions the United States has on Russia 
and Iran, and the impact that this will have on the dollar. Mostly the two “sanction 
buddies” will look for ways to undermine the United States. The two countries 
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have long discussed an oil-for-goods exchange program to divert the sanctions for 
use of the USD in transactions with Iran. In addition, as Europeans are upset by 
the United States withdrawal from the Iran deal, there has been talk of 
establishing networks to doing a large amount of global transactions in the Euro 
or Swiss franc, which would greatly hurt the USD dominance as a reserve 
currency.	  One such attempt, by the European Union, specifically by France, 
Germany, and the UK, is the institution of INSTEX (Instrument in Support of 
Trade Exchanges). This may not succeed, but is yet another indicator that 
countries might be trying to escape from the adverse effects of the USD reserve 
currency monopoly. Slav also discusses the influence of pricing oil in euros as 
opposed to dollars. The Russians are making a strong push to circumvent the 
dollar, and Russian oil companies are urging Western commodity traders to pay in 
euro. This is yet other example of the importance of the 2015-2018 and the 
shifting dynamic involving the de-dollarization of the international reserve 
network.   
China’s role as a developing global player can very much accelerated, 
particularly due to the global political climate that we witness today. As we have 
mentioned, it has many positive attributes that would make it a viable option for 
an increased role in the international monetary system. Despite also facing many 
barriers to entry, it has been known to be an “exception to the rule” in many 
instances. In addition, in recent years China has made major pushes towards 
globalization, making significant investments in infrastructure and trade networks. 
Coinciding with the IMF’s recognition of the Chinese Yuan as a reserve currency 
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is an extremely unique political environment globally characterized by President 
Trump and pushes towards nationalism. We believe that all of this combined 
solidifies the years post 2015 as extremely important to study in order to get a full 
understanding of the past, current, and future of the international monetary 
system.  
 
D. Previous Methods 
 
 Much of the work that has previously been discussed studies the shares 
and explicit use of various currencies globally to gauge each currency’s role and 
influence. For example Eichengreen, Chitu, and Mehl (2016), as discussed earlier, 
analyze network and policy effects by looking at the size of the shares of reported 
reserves. Although the work does a great job of expanding the data set back in 
time, there is still little data for the RMB. That is inherently due to the fact of how 
recent IMF reporting of the RMB is. Furthermore, Eichengreen, Chitu, and Mehl 
show that there are a lot of holes in IMF reporting that despite a relatively good 
job of plugging, it still creates problems when combining data sets from various 
sources over a long time frame would have.  
 This then begs the essential question of this research. How do we 
accurately measure the RMB’s influence as a reserve currency in an international 
monetary system that has recently shown signs of diversifying? To answer this we 
turn to work done by Tovar and Nor (2018) introducing an alternative approach to 
measuring the influence of reserve currencies than the typical one found in other 
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literature. More specifically, calculating the influence that each major currency 
bloc has on other currencies. This work from 1969-2015 will serve as the 
foundation for our research as we focus on the more recent time period for the 
reasons discussed in the previous sections. 
  Tovar and Nor study currency co-movements of national currencies with 
reserve currencies to determine what reserve currency bloc each national currency 
is a part of. It is then possible to calculate the global share of GDP that each 
reserve currency influences. The results indicate that the USD is dominant with a 
global share of GDP of about 40 percent. Interestingly, this is followed by the 
RMB with about a 30 percent share of global GDP. Finally the Euro holds around 
20 percent. This indicates that the sphere of influence of the RMB is larger than 
otherwise thought in work analyzing reserve currency shares. In addition, the 
RMB going into 2015 already has an established influence globally. 
In order to calculate each sphere of influence Tovar and Nor built on 
Frankel and Weis’s (1994) methodology for analysis using workhorse regressions. 
This methodology is argued to have some drawbacks particularly with the fact 
that the RMB has been pegged to the USD in the past, which presents a 
collinearity problem. So to address these concerns the researchers employ Kawai 
and Pontines’ (2016) approach to analyzing the sphere of influence of the RMB. 
There is a major difference between the work of Kawai and Pountines and 
Tovar and Nor. That is Kawai and Pountines looked at the sphere of influence of 
the RMB in Asia whereas Tovar and Nor were able to expand this approach to the 
global scale. Kawai and Pountines believed that if a large effect were to be 
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measured for the RMB it would be more localized in the Chinese region. Tovar 
and Nor were able to verify that this effect was in fact extended globally.  
To measure the global effect the researchers calculated a relative and 
absolute sphere of influence for each of the major reserve currency to gather an in 
depth look at the historical and recent state of the international monetary system. 
This is groundbreaking work that we look to expand upon by incorporating the 
most recent three-year period. We will also look to duplicate their results and 
corroborate their findings. 
The work found that the transition from a bi-polar reserve system to a tri-
polar system is well underway. However, the USD still, as is the case historically, 
plays the dominant role. A lot of the RMB’s influence is attributed to BRICs 
currencies. BRIC refers to Brazil, Russia, India and China. These countries are 
grouped because they are at a similar stage of economic development. 
Interestingly, the influence of the RMB is more on BRICS currencies as opposed 
to playing a central role in Asia. Part of our work will be devoted to seeing if in 
the last few years this makeup of the RMB’s influence has changed. That is we 
will look to see if the RMB dominance is extended beyond the BRICS currencies. 
With that said, the RMB dominance in these countries is extremely important. We 
expect that as these countries continue to grow, so will the role of the RMB 
internationally. 
The researchers also looked at the reserve currency blocs and how they 
changed over time. First there was a decrease in the use of the dollar following the 
end of the Bretton Woods agreement. Furthermore, there were decreases in each 
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region during the respective financial crises that were faced (ERM crisis 
decreased the European share whereas 2007 decreased the dollars). Finally, there 
was a large increase in the European shares following the introduction to the 
Euro. These findings add light to the fact that major economic events, particularly 
those pertaining to the international monetary system, do greatly impact the 
influence of reserve currencies. Thus far, we have seen ample evidence to suggest 
that there would be a shifting dynamic of the RMB following the recognition as a 
reserve currency by the IMF in the age of Trump.     
In addition to studying the influence of each major reserve currency the 
work also analyzed what factors play an important role in determining a 
currencies influence. What was found was that networking effects play a big role 
still, somewhat contrasting the work on the upheaval hypothesis. In addition the 
size of a country matters, and as we stated before China has seen unprecedented 
growth in recent history. Finally debt levels hurt the size of blocs and current 
account surpluses undermine them. 
  These works lay the groundwork for how our research will be conducted. 
Another interesting avenue that could be explored in the future is the role of the 
demand for oil in determining the influence of a reserve currency. As we 
discussed earlier there is the prospect of Russia pricing oil in Euros. It is therefore 
possible to remove the influence of oil to get a true “influence” of each reserve 
currency. This would also give an idea of the importance of oil and how shifting 
global dynamics will impact the influence of each respective reserve currency. 
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E. Conclusions 
 
 The formation of the Bretton-Woods system in 1944 laid the groundwork 
for the international monetary system that we have today. However, many major 
events including its demise in 1971 have led to many changes along the way. 
Particularly over time there has been a shifting dynamic allowing for the 
diversification of reserve currencies, and many major global players rising to be 
formidable candidates for reserve currencies. We have already seen this to be the 
case with the euro.  
 We expect this to be the case with the RMB as well. As many researchers 
have already seen, the Chinese currency already plays a role internationally. We 
believe that with a combination of the current global political climate, China’s 
rise in terms of GDP and FDI as well as significant investment in trade in the One 
Belt, One Road project, and the IMFs formal recognition of the Chinese currency 
as an official reserve currency all bolster the RMBs influence in global markets. 
We will be able to test this theory by imploring previous methods into co-
movement of currencies with the major reserve currencies. This will in turn allow 
us to see what change, if any, the Chinese Yuan experienced post 2015. 
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Chapter Three  
Methods 
 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 In this chapter we will provide a detailed description of our research 
methodology. This includes the data and the models that we use, as well as other 
tools that we applied in our analysis. Our work employs modified workhorse 
regressions as well as other techniques to analyze the role of major reserve 
currencies on the global scale. We seek to show an updated view of the influence 
of reserve currencies globally. This is especially important in the age of Trump 
and with the formal recognition of the RMB as an international reserve currency. 
In this section we will explain our choice of the model as well as defend the 
various methods that we use. This chapter will be split into three different 
sections. The first will detail our data discussing what data was used, where the 
data came from, and the process of cleaning the data. The second section will 
outline our empirical model and the reasons for choosing this method as opposed 
to other alternatives. Finally, the third section will discuss additional steps we 
took in our analysis. This includes addressing and ruling out potential problems 
that we face.  
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B. Data 
 
Our work uses exchange rate data as reported by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF has near global membership, as it is comprised 
of 189 countries. The IMF’s main goal is to ensure the stability of the 
international monetary system. They also provide reliable, up to date economic 
data. For exchange rate data we use end of period monthly data reported by the 
IMF’s International Financial Statistics. Our model uses exchange rates per USD 
for reasons explained in the next section. To visualize the data that will be used 
for this research, log scale exchange rates in terms of USD can be seen in Figure 
2.    
 
Figure 2- Log scale end of period monthly exchange rates per USD for 2006M1-
2018M11. 
 
Source: IMF  
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 We chose our time frame from 2006M1-2018M11 for multiple reasons. 
First, we see very low correlation between the United States dollar and the 
renminbi. We found the correlation to be .546, which is extremely encouraging 
for the use of this time period in our results. This is especially true considering 
that there were time periods where the RMB was directly pegged to the USD with 
a perfect correlation of 1.This also implies this is actually a period of relatively 
free floating for the renminbi backing up historical accounts. As we will discuss 
later, this greatly helps to deal with the multicolinearity of our model. The second 
reason we used this time period is that our work looks to paint an up to date 
picture of the global influence of major currencies. Since China’s currency started 
to become a large global player during this time, it is imperative that it is the 
focus of our study. Finally, this allows for a large sample of countries with 
complete data. We use a representative sample of 149 countries to estimate the 
global influence of the reserve currencies. Countries whose data was incomplete 
were removed from our sample. In addition, we argue our 155 data points are 
sufficient to create a respectable sample size for the model.    
Our data for gross domestic product at purchasing-power parity (GDP-
PPP) is obtained from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook database. We use the 
individual share of GDP-PPP an individual country has in a given year. This is 
annual data reported at the end of each period. Our work uses the global shares of 
GDP-PPP for 2018. This is to ensure that our results are reflexive of the time 
period that we are using, as well as to provide a clear scope of the current outlook.  
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C. Model 
 
 This work utilizes models employed by Tovar and Nor (2018). These 
models are difference in log workhorse regression models that were initially used 
by Frankel and Wei (1994). They are designed to analyze co-movement of 
international currencies with the major reserve currencies. However, there were 
some drawbacks to Frankel and Wei’s equation. Namely, the biggest problem was 
the fact that the effects of the RMB were not measured. This at the time was 
understandable, but as the RMB came into fruition and a major reserve currency, 
it needed to be included. Therefore Tovar and Nor use a modified approach used 
by Kawai and Pontines (2016). This model measured the effect of the RMB. 
Kawai and Pontines’ model only focused on a localized region in Asia in their 
analysis. Therefore, Tovar and Nor extended this model on the global scale. They 
were the first researchers to do a global scale of this kind of analysis. We will 
employ the same equation that Tovar and Nor used in their work. Our work will 
then show an updated picture of the various reserve currencies on the global scale 
in the age of Trump and post official recognition of the RMB as a reserve 
currency by the IMF. The model is expressed in the following form:   
 
Δlog(x/USD)t= β0 + β1Δlog(EUR/USD)t + β2Δlog(GBP/USD)t + 
β3Δlog(JPY/USD)t + β4Δlog(RMB/USD)t + εt 
(1) 
 
 
where x is an individual country and USD serves as our choice for the numeraire 
currency. Our dependent variable is the logarithmic change in of a country’s 
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currency in terms of the USD. The regression coefficients represent the weight 
each major reserve currency has on currency x. Since we use difference in log we 
can calculate the “inferred” United States effect. This is done by the constraint β5 
= 1 - β1 - β2 - β3 - β4.  
 Tovar and Nor (2018) use equation (1) throughout their work but express 
collinearity problems with the RMB as it was pegged to the USD for a long 
period of time. They address these problems by employing a second two-stage 
model. In this work we use an alternative method to address these problems. That 
is, we use a sample period in which the RMB was not pegged to the USD. As 
stated before our period will range from 2006-2018. By choosing the USD as our 
numeraire currency, as well as leaving it out of our initial model and calculating 
the effect afterwards, we are able to alleviate the collinearity problem.    
 Our methods use a comprehensive list of 149 countries to create a 
balanced sample to estimate effects. We will repeat equation (1) 149 times 
running the regression once for each country in our sample. In each case we will 
note the highest coefficient in the model. Country x will then be placed into the 
reserve currency bloc for whichever has the highest coefficient. So by calculating 
the weight of each reserve currency on each individual country we can calculate 
the sphere of influence each reserve currency has. We obtain the size of reserve 
currency blocs by assigning a country’s GDP-PPP reported by the IMF global 
outlook data to the country whose reserve currency has the greatest influence on 
that country’s currency, as found from the coefficients in (1).    
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 Our methods serve as an alternative to traditional studies about reserve 
currencies. Typical studies look mostly as shares of reserve currencies and factors 
that affect reserve currencies. Our methods are beneficial in that we can measure 
the direct effect the reserve currencies themselves have internationally. They are 
also useful in that they not only paint a picture on the global scale with currency 
blocs, but we can also point to individual countries and how each currency is 
directly impacted. This allows us to put countries and regions into historical 
context as well as utilize traditional findings to support or explain our results. In 
addition, our methods allow for measuring the effect of the RMB both prior to 
and post being officially recognized as a reserve currency by the IMF in 2015.  
 
D. Additional Methods 
       
 This section is devoted to addressing concerns with our model as well as 
discussing additional steps that were taken. The first problem that we incurred 
was with autocorrelation. This is measured by the Durbin-Watson statistic. 
Durbin-Watson always has a value between 0 and 4 with a value of 2 meaning 
there was no autocorrelation detected in the sample. If the value is less than 2 it 
implies there is positive autocorrelation detected in the sample while greater than 
two is negative autocorrelation. This is a very useful tool to have considering our 
data is time series. 
We ran a significance test on our Durbin-Watson statistic for each of the 
149 models at the 1 percent level. We had 155 observations in each regression as 
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well as 4 right hand side variables. Our lower bound was 1.57 and our upper 
bound was 1.679. First if the statistic is greater than 2 we subtract it from 4. Then, 
if the statistic is greater than the upper bound and less than 2 then we fail to reject 
the null hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation. We found this to be the case in 
most of our models. However, if the Durbin-Watson statistic is lower than the 
lower bound then we reject the null hypothesis and there is autocorrelation 
present. This was the case in almost one third of our models. There is a third case 
for this significance test. That is, the test is inconclusive if the Durbin-Watson 
statistic is in between the lower and upper bounds. To err on the side of caution 
we took a conservative approach in which we failed to reject the null if the 
statistic was between the two bounds.  
Our next step in this process of dealing with autocorrelation was to run 
autoregressive models for each case autocorrelation was found. The first step in 
the process is running (1) at time t, however we believe the error in this case is not 
random as seen in the first order autoregressive error structure, which is expressed 
in the following form:    
 
εt = ρεt-1 + et 
(2) 
 
In (2) et is random error. To extract this random error we then run (1) at time t-1 
and multiply through by ρ. Subsequently we subtract this from (1) at time t. This 
yields: 
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Δlog(x/USD)t= ρΔlog(x/USD)t-1 + β0 - ρβ0 + β1Δlog(EUR/USD)t - 
ρβ1Δlog(EUR/USD)t-1 + β2Δlog(GBP/USD)t - ρ β2Δlog(GBP/USD)t-1 + 
β3Δlog(JPY/USD)t - ρβ3Δlog(GBP/USD)t-1 + β4Δlog(RMB/USD)t  - 
ρβ4Δlog(GBP/USD)t-1 + εt - ρεt-1 
 (3) 
 
Note that if we solve for et in (2) the result is precisely the error term in (3) 
allowing for random error in our model. A major problem with autoregressive 
models is the impact they have on coefficients. However, this is not the case with 
the results of our models. In every case the coefficients only changed very 
slightly, and the largest coefficient never changed in our autoregressive model. In 
addition the significance of the coefficients never changed. This allows us to rule 
out autocorrelation as a major problem in our models. This is expected as using 
difference in logs already minimizes the effect of autocorrelation.  
We also wanted to delve into the predictive power of or regressions. One 
way to do so is to calculate the R-squared predicted values. R-squared predicted is 
a measure for how well the model makes predictions. It is also useful in that it is a 
good indicator on if the model overfits the data. The statistic is calculated by 
removing a data point, running the regression, predicting the removed data point, 
and then comparing that predicted point to the actual observed value. This process 
is then repeated for all of the data points.  
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Another useful tool for analyzing the predictive power of our models is 
forecasting. This is done in a similar fashion as the predicted R-squared. 
However, instead of predicting every point separately we can reduce our sample 
size to 2006-2015 and predict from then on. For individual countries this is an 
extremely useful tool. Particularly if we believe that there is a stark difference due 
to the recognition of the RMB as a reserve currency we would see poor 
predictions with high error. We can apply this method to a select group of key 
counties such as the Russian Federation and Brazil.  
 
E. Conclusions 
 
 We believe that our methods achieve the goals that we have set. They 
provide an accurate up to date look at the current state of major reserve currencies 
through reliable and updated data. In addition our time period of interest has low 
multicolinearity. Multicolinearty poses many problems for time periods where the 
RMB is pegged to the USD. We were able to account for autocorrelation. Using 
difference in logs mostly accounts for autocorrelation on its own, but we were 
able to further address this problem through the use of autoregressive models. 
Finally we were able explore the predictive power of our models. With the 
implementation of these methods and techniques we believe we can provide 
reliable and accurate results.  
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Chapter Four 
Results  
 
A. Introduction 
 
 In this section we will outline the results of our analysis. Our results will 
be detailed in two ways. First, we will look at countries at the individual level. 
More specifically, we will look at important cases for particular countries, and 
then discuss the reasons for certain currency reserve influences. This includes 
Russia, which in recent years has attempted to circumvent United States’ 
sanctions. In addition we look at regions such as Central America, Africa, and the 
Middle East and discuss general trends we observe with countries in the region. 
We will also point out some anomalies in our results such as Israel, Brazil, and 
Mexico, which we previously expected to be more in line with the USD. We will 
then be able to comment on the importance of our results on the global scale. This 
entails establishing and analyzing currency reserve blocs and discussing the 
current state of the international monetary system. We calculate both absolute and 
relative currency blocs and discuss the viability of their use. We will then 
comment on future implications that our results have.    
 
B. Regression Results  
 
 Table 1 displays the correlation matrix for the currencies in terms of the 
USD. There is very little to no correlation between these currencies. The 
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correlation between the pound and the euro is .718 but we do not see this as a 
cause for concern. They pound also has minor global influence relative to the 
other three reserve currencies, as we will discuss later on.     
 
Currency  EURO RMB YEN POUND 
EURO 1 -0.118719323 0.47868885 0.718113447 
RMB -0.11871932 1 0.370757467 -0.427632543 
YEN 0.47868885 0.370757467 1 -0.013579476 
POUND 0.718113447 -0.427632543 -0.01357947 1 
Table 1 - Correlation matrix of exchange rates in terms of USD from 2006-2018. 
Source: IMF 
 
 We start by looking at Russia. This country is of particular interest to our 
work for multiple reasons. The sheer size of Russia makes it important on the 
global scale, especially for the outlook of the international monetary system. 
However, it is primarily interesting in its current state because of the sanctions 
that the United States have imposed on Russia and Russia’s desire to circumvent 
these sanctions by using other currencies in international transactions. Therefore it 
comes as no surprise that the weight the USD has on the Russian ruble is not 
significantly different from zero. However, what is interesting is that the Chinese 
RMB accounts for the largest portion of movement in the ruble. We also see a 
very large effect for the euro. Both the euro and the RMB are statistically 
significant at the 5% level in the autoregressive error model. 
 It is clear from our results that Russia has taken steps to circumvent the 
dollar. Russia is aligning itself almost evenly with China and Europe. Importantly, 
it is an example of a large portion of the international monetary system where the 
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USD is not a major factor. This is, at least in some sense, an indication that the 
United States can lose its global dominance if countries are unhappy with the 
United States. It certainly shows that the USD in the current make up of the 
international monetary system is sharing the world stage with other major 
currencies.  
 The predicted R Squared for this model is .168. This is in general not 
good. However, it is close to the R Squared Adjusted for our model of .23. This 
tells us we are not over fitting the data. Additionally we restricted the sample size 
from 2006-2015. We then used this model to forecast 2015-2018. This can be 
seen in Figure 3. The predicted values are plotted in orange and the actual values 
are plotted in blue. Overall our model did a poor job predicting in this case. The 
mean absolute percent error was 55 and the root mean squared error was 36.88. 
We attribute this to fundamental changes in Russia’s use of international 
currencies, particularly pertaining to the sanctions placed by the United States. In 
this case this is represented by a shift in the intercept, which can be seen in Figure 
3.  
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Figure 3- Predicted exchange rate values from 2015-2018 for the ruble plotted in 
orange. The actual values are plotted in blue. The x-axis is month with 2006M1=1 
and 2018M11=155. 
 
Another major country of interest is Brazil. We found that the euro has the 
largest effect on the Brazilian real. Our models show that the euro accounts for 
about 58% of movement in the real. This is statistically significant at the 5% 
level. We also saw that the RMB accounts for about 26% of movement in the real, 
however this was not significant. This result is somewhat surprising. Particularly, 
with the proximity to the United States, and with the United States being a large 
trading partner of Brazil, we would expect that the USD would affect the real 
more than its reserve currency counterparts, as is the case with most Central 
American countries and in other South American countries like Uruguay. Yet we 
only see a weight of 3%. Brazil is also not the only example of a South American 
country with similar results but it is certainly the largest. However, these results 
can be explained. 
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According to the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC) 42 percent 
of Brazilian exports are to Asia with 20 percent going to Europe and 17 going to 
North America. Similarly Brazils imports predominantly come from Asia and 
Europe at 36 and 27 percent respectively. Brazil has a strong iron-ore trading 
network with Europe and Asia. Therefore, it is reasonable to understand why 
these are the currencies that have such a large effect on the real, as well as in other 
South American countries with the mineral trade. There has also been a 
substantial amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) from China into Brazil in 
recent years. As Chinese firms shift their focus to the service sector there has been 
a substantial increase in FDI in Latin America and in particular Brazil. According 
to the OECD flows of FDI from China into Latin America have reached over 110 
billion dollars with 60 billion going to Brazil (Avendano, MelGuizo, and Miner 
2017).  
We also found many African countries whose currency is greatly impacted 
by the euro. The euro accounts for about 95% of movement in the CFA franc. 
This is again statistically significant at the 5% level. The pound is also shown to 
have a weight of 1% statistically significant at the 5% level. As was the case with 
Brazil, Europe imports a lot of natural resources from Africa. Cote D'Ivoire for 
example sends 11 percent of its exports to Germany according to the OEC. About 
10 percent go to the Netherlands with 6.5 percent going to France. This is 
substantially more than the 10 percent to the United States. 
   Economic ties between Europe and Africa go well beyond just trade. 
Africa first started facing European aggression in the 1870’s. In 1884 the Berlin 
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Conference was held to divide Africa amongst the European countries (Davies 
2010). European colonization in Africa has greatly affected political and 
economic ties ever since. Since there is such a large European presence in Africa, 
it comes as no surprise that the euro has such a large effect on African currencies.  
We similarly see that the USD has a lot of influence in the Middle East. 
The United States is actively involved in this region and has been for a long time. 
This is true both militarily and economically with regards to oil. The United 
States also has historically had a large FDI in the region.  Many of the countries in 
this region are greatly impacted by the United States and the United States dollar. 
For example, the United Arab Emirates dirham is directly pegged to the USD. We 
also see in the autoregressive error model for Yemen, the USD accounts for 99% 
of the movement of the Yemeni rial. Throughout this time period the rial had 
mostly been pegged to the USD as well. In addition, the USD has the largest 
weight on the Afghan afghani. We found that the USD accounts for 63% of 
movement in the afghani. We did find that the RMB accounts for 29% of 
movement. This was statistically significant at the 5% level. So there are other 
influencers in the Middle East, but predominantly this region is a United States 
stronghold in terms of currency movement.  
One surprise to be noted was Israel. Israel is a key political ally of the 
United States in the Middle East. It is reasonable to suspect that the USD would 
have the largest influence on the Israeli new shekel. However, this is not the case. 
The USD does account for around 11% of movements in the new shekel, which is 
a considerable amount, but it is not the largest weight. That belongs to the RMB 
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at around 38%. This was significant at the 10% level. The euro is significant at 
the 5% level and has a weight of around 32%. Also, the pound was significant at 
the 5% level and accounts for around 16% of movement in the new shekel. We 
also found that the yen has a 2% weight but this was not statistically significant.  
 Israel is so aligned with the United States; it begs the question why is its 
currency so greatly influenced by the RMB? Abrams (2018) describes China and 
Israel as both being very pragmatic countries. They expand partnership, test new 
markets, and seek new trade opportunities. Recently Israel has been developing 
new bilateral trade relationships. In particular, they have greatly expanded 
economic relationships with China. Abrams states that this is because China is 
significantly interested in Israel’s technology sector, while Israel welcomes 
Chinese investments. We argue that the results of our regressions and the RMB 
influence on the new shekel are reflexive of the recently and quickly expanding 
economic ties that have been observed between China and Israel.  
The R Squared Adjusted for our model of Israel is .32 and our R Squared 
Predicted is .3. Again these both in general are not high but they are similar which 
tells us our model is not over fitting.  When we restrict our sample and forecast 
2015-2018, the model does a decent job of predicting. The root mean squared 
error is .3 and the mean absolute percent error is 7.1. Like Russia we see a small 
downward shit of the intercept in this case. This can be seen in Figure 4.  
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Figure 4- Predicted exchange rate values for the new shekel plotted in orange. The 
actual values are plotted in blue. These values are predicted from 2015-2018. The 
x-axis is month with 2006M1=1 and 2018M11=155. 
 
 
Mexico is a similar case to Israel. Despite sharing boarders with the 
United States, the USD is not the biggest influencer of the Mexican peso. We 
found the RMB to have the largest weight but this was not statistically significant. 
We found the euro to account for 34% of the movements of the peso and this was 
statistically significant at the 5% level. Mexico is similar to the case of Israel in 
that is a pragmatic country. However, there is a large difference here. In recent 
years Mexico has aligned itself more with China, especially in terms of trade. 
This is occurring because of a more hostile relationship that Mexico has with the 
United States, particularly with the period of renegotiation of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement.   
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C. Global Impacts 
  
 Based on our regression results for each country individually we assigned 
global shares of GDP-PPP to each reserve currency. These are known as currency 
blocs. We constructed our reserve currency blocs in two ways. The first were 
absolute currency blocs. This involved assigning each country to a reserve 
currency solely based on which reserve currency accounted for the most 
movement in that particular country’s currency. The next were relative currency 
blocs. In this case each country’s global share of GDP-PPP was split between 
each of the major reserve currencies based on the coefficients in each individual 
regression. 
  First we will discuss the absolute currency blocs. The results can be seen 
in Table 2. About 5% of the global share of GDP-PPP was unaccounted for. This 
is for two reasons. The first is that not every country had GDP-PPP data. The 
second is that not every country had complete data on exchange rates from 2006-
2018. However we feel that this is a very good representation of the current state 
of the international monetary fund. We find, like Tovar and Nor (2018), that the 
international monetary system is now tri-polar. China has a strong foothold in the 
global economy. Surprisingly we find that in this time period the United States 
has a share of 31.21 which is less than the 40.7 Tovar and Nor found from 2011-
2015. Interestingly we do not see an increased share for China. They found the 
Chinese share to be 32.5 where we find it to be 30.07. It is Europe that sees the 
increased share from 19.5 to 27.43. That leads us to believe that as the dollar loses 
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grip in the international monetary system, it will be the euro that makes up this 
ground. 
 
 US Europe China Japan UK 
Absolute Share 31.2 27.4 30.1 4.2 2.2 
Tovar and Nor (2018) 40.1 19.5 32.5 4.8 2.5 
 
Table 2- Absolute currency bloc of global shares of GDP-PPP in percent (Approx. 
5% of global GDP-PP is unaccounted for in our work) 
 
We then turn to the relative currency blocs. The results can be seen in 
Table 3. We see similar results as the absolute bloc in that there is a tri-polar 
system. However, we see in this case that the US bloc is not the dominant one and 
that in fact the Chinese bloc is. This is very surprising. However, we do not see 
these results as reliable as the absolute blocs. This is mostly because they are 
much more vulnerable to error in our estimations. For example in the relative bloc 
we find Japan to have 3.22% of global GDP-PPP, however this is less than its 
own GDP. This is because we are relying on the culmination of many 
insignificant coefficients in which many appear as negative. This is opposed to 
basing the blocs on strongly significant coefficients like we do for the absolute 
bloc. 
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 US Europe China Japan UK 
Relative Share 25.2 28.2 31.8 3.2 6.8 
Tovar and Nor (2018) 39 20.3 31.6 5.3 4 
 
Table 3- Relative currency bloc of global shares of GDP-PPP in percent (Approx. 
5% of global GDP-PP is unaccounted for) 
 
Our results have major impacts on the global scale. Figure 5 shows a map 
graph for each absolute currency bloc. Clearly neighboring countries are more 
prone to being included in a major bloc, with some exceptions. This includes 
Mexico and Canada which Tovar and Nor (2018) find to be in the US bloc. This 
is another example of the decline of the Unites States global economic influence 
in the past few years. It is clear that there are three major reserve currency blocs 
and that the international monetary system in its current state is tri-polar.  
 
 
Figure 5- Map graph of absolute major reserve blocs. Red represents the US, 
yellow China, orange Europe, dark green UK, light green Japan, and white 
countries do not have complete data.   
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 We also have to consider the argument that we need to remove the 
country’s own GDP-PPP from the bloc. By subtracting this out from the absolute 
shares we see that the United States and Europe become virtually even at 16% of 
global GDP-PPP. China goes to 11% and both the UK and Japan go to 0%. This 
does not change the overall scope of our results. It does however, bode in favor of 
Europe, which throughout this analysis has shown strong upticks in comparison to 
the work of Tovar and Nor.  
 
D. Conclusions 
 
 Our results show a tri-polar international monetary system. This is directly 
in line with the results found by Tovar and Nor (2018). However, we see an 
increase in the influence of the Euro over our time frame from 2006-2018 in 
addition to a decrease in the dominance of the dollar. We see geographical 
changes such as Canada and Mexico changing from the US bloc to the Euro bloc 
and Chinese bloc respectively. We additionally found that the Chinese renminbi 
has a bloc of around 30% of the global share of GDP-PPP. Surprisingly with the 
recognition of the Chinese RMB as a reserve currency in 2015 there does not 
seem to be a rise in its sphere of influence. It is the Euro whose influence seems to 
grow as the dollar’s influence falls. We find that in absolute terms the United 
States still dominates the international monetary system, but in relative terms its 
influence has declined. 
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Chapter Five 
Conclusions 
 
A. Future Work 
 
 There is a lot of room for future work in this area. Most importantly, as 
more exchange rate data becomes available these results can be updated to reflect 
the time period. As this work has shown many factors including political events 
and policy decisions can change the landscape of the international monetary 
system and it is important to understand these changes. More work can be done 
for the prediction of the future outlook of currency blocs. Autoregressive 
integrated moving average (ARIMA) models can be used to predict exchange 
rates for major reserve currencies, which can then be used to predict the major 
influencers in the near future. Finally, more work can be done to integrate 
traditional methods of studying reserve currencies with the methods used in this 
research. This would allow for a more complex analysis and a greater 
understanding of reserves and the international monetary system.  
 
B. Summary of Work and Closing Statements  
 
 Using workhorse regression methods on exchange rate data from 2006-
2018 we were able to provide an updated look at the international monetary 
system in a time where the international geopolitical climate is changing and 
China has gained more recognition. We find that the United States dollar is still 
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the dominant reserve currency with its global share of GDP-PPP at 31.21 percent. 
However, we show that it has experienced a decline in recent years for many 
reasons such as increased Chinese investment and the circumvention of US-
imposed sanctions by countries like Iran and Russia. Importantly, we showed that 
there were major changes that occurred at the country level compared to previous 
periods. This included changes in the major currency influencer of Canada and 
Mexico. Finally, our work shows that we are presently in a major time period of 
potential transition in terms of the international monetary system.   
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Appendix	  	  
Variable	  Descriptions	  
	  Variable	  	   Name	  in	  Data	  Set	   Description	  X/USD	   ANY	  COUNTRY	  NAME	   International	  Monetary	  Fund	  end	  of	  period	  monthly	  exchange	  rates	  per	  USD	  of	  currency	  of	  country	  X	  from	  2006M1-­‐2018M11.	  	  EUR/USD	   euroarea	   International	  Monetary	  Fund	  end	  of	  period	  monthly	  euro	  exchange	  rates	  per	  USD	  from	  2006M1-­‐2018M11.	  	  RMB/USD	   chinaprmainland	   International	  Monetary	  Fund	  end	  of	  period	  monthly	  renminbi	  exchange	  rates	  per	  USD	  from	  2006M1-­‐2018M11.	  	  GBP/USD	   unitedkingdom	   International	  Monetary	  Fund	  end	  of	  period	  monthly	  pound	  sterling	  exchange	  rates	  per	  USD	  from	  2006M1-­‐2018M11.	  	  JPY/USD	   japan	   International	  Monetary	  Fund	  end	  of	  period	  monthly	  yen	  exchange	  rates	  per	  USD	  from	  2006M1-­‐2018M11.	  	  Gross	  Domestic	  Product	  at	  Purchasing	  Power	  Parity	  
GDP-­‐PPP	   Country	  2018	  global	  share	  of	  Gross	  Domestic	  Product	  at	  Purchasing	  Power	  Parity	  provided	  by	  the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund.	  	  
	  
